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ABSTRACT: The importance of robustness as a property of structural systems has been recognised following
several structural failures, such as that at Ronan Point in 1968, where the consequences were deemed unacceptable
relative to the initiating damage. A variety of research efforts in the past decades have attempted to quantify
aspects of robustness such as redundancy and identify design principles that can improve robustness. This
paper outlines the progress of recent work by the Joint Committee on Structural Safety (JCSS) to develop
comprehensive guidance on assessing and providing robustness in structural systems. Guidance is provided
regarding the assessment of robustness in a framework that considers potential hazards to the system, vulnerability
of system components, and failure consequences. Several proposed methods for quantifying robustness are
reviewed, and guidelines for robust design will be proposed. The document adopts a probabilistic risk assessment
framework and includes guidance for decision-making related to robustness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Robustness of structural systems has gained renewed
interest following the collapse of the World Trade
Centre towers on September 11, 2001. This disas-
ter happened at a time when regulatory requirements
related to disproportionate collapse were considered
to be adequate and related research was petering out,
except for a few initiatives such as that of the UK
described by (Reeves et al. 1999), (Canisius et al. 2001)
and (Matthews et al. 2005). As a result of the 9/11
incidents stakeholders worldwide have now begun
to re-examine relevant issues, including malicious
attacks, holistically by incorporating associated risks.
Another reason for increased interest in robustness
is that most failures of structures are due to unex-
pected loads, design errors, errors during execution,
unforeseen deterioration and poor maintenance which
is not possible to design against using conventional
component based code checking formats.
Several significant initiatives in the field of robust-
ness have already been initiated by the Joint Com-
mittee on Structural Safety (JCSS). The first was an
International Workshop on Robustness of Structures,
co-sponsored with IABSE and held at BRE in England
in November 2005. The two-day workshop which had
nearly thirty presentations was attended by nearly fifty
international experts.
The JCSS’s second initiative, the development
robustness-related guidance, is described in this paper.
This guidance document is expected to bridge the sig-
nificant gap that exists between the philosophical and
practical aspect of providing and assessing robustness.
From among the many aspects covered in the guidance
document, which is currently titled ‘Provision and
Assessment of Structural Robustness’, the following
issues are briefly described in the rest of this paper:
• The issue of disproportionate failure
• The current principles of designing for robustness.
• The contents of the guidance document.
• System approaches to robustness
• Methods of quantifying robustness
• Decision making related to robustness, and
• Effects of quality and gross errors.
2 DISPROPORTIONATE FAILURE
Disproportionate failure of a structural system can be
described as the situation where the total damage (or
risks) resulting from an action is much greater than the
1
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initial damage caused by the action which acted upon
only a local region or a component of the structure
system. Progressive collapse, where the initial failure
of one or more components results in a series of subse-
quent failures of components not directly affected by
the original action is a mode of failure that can give
rise to disproportionate failure.
Progressive collapse issues came to the fore of engi-
neering thinking following the partial collapse of the
Ronan Point building in London in 1968, due to an
internal gas explosion (H.M. Stationery Office 1968).
Although progressive failure, especially of structures
during construction, had occurred previously (Taylor
and Schriever 1976), they had not interested engineers
and regulators in the way the failure of the occu-
pied 22-storey Ronan Point building did. The main
reason for the sudden importance was not only the
potential for fatalities and injuries during failure of
a residential building of this kind, but also the public
perception issues given rise to by the major parliamen-
tary inquiry that took place (Ministry of Housing and
Local Government, 1968c).
Following the recommendations of the official
inquiry into the Ronan Point failure, the world’s first-
ever robustness related regulations came into force in
the UK. These were initially issued via Circulars of the
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1968a, b)
and then, in 1970, via theAmendment 5 to the Building
Regulations (Canisius 2006). Although those require-
ments had been developed in relation to the hazard of
internal gas explosions, they were also considered to
provide a minimum safety level under impact actions
and other extra-ordinary action situations (op cit.).
The principles behind the robustness related
requirements currently implemented in various coun-
tries originated from the UK requirements which were
developed via much theoretical and experimental stud-
ies and professional debate. The UK’s robustness
requirements have been later also tested on some full-
scale buildings for specific situations, by BRE, for
example, see (Canisius et al. 2001) and (Matthews et
al. 2005).These requirements have been also indirectly
(and successfully) tested with respect to a new hazard,
bomb explosions, during the mainland UK bombing
campaigns of the IRA.
2.1 The post-9/11 situation
With the end of the IRA campaigns, the relative
peacefulness of the world and the lack of significant
collapses in the western world resulted in a gradual
reduction of progressive collapse related research in
the 1990s although some work still continued in vari-
ous countries such as that in the UK described above.
This research work, however, related to the loss of a
single load bearing member due to a single action.
Whereas renewed interest in robustness was gen-
erated by the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma, USA in 1995 (Hinman and
Hammond 1997), it was the 2001 World Trade Cen-
tre incidents that created, like no other in the past, a
significant interest on robustness issues. The reason
for the unparalleled importance of the 9/11 incidents
in Manhattan were many, including the amount of
deaths and destruction caused, the symbolic nature of
the buildings, the targeted country and reasons for the
attack, and real-time television transmission of the dis-
aster. That is, it was a combination of safety and public
perception issues that made the world look at robust-
ness of structures and progressive collapse again with
a renewed interest.
The 9/11 incidents disaster has made engineers and
regulators ask questions on:
– the adequacy of national building regulations;
– the adequacy of current knowledge in relation to
severe malicious attacks and combinations of serial
extraordinary actions;
– decision making in the presence of alternative
solutions; and
– public perception issues related to safety.
It is such concerns that made the attendees of the
JCSS/IABSE International Workshop on Robustness
of November 2005 decide on the need for a guid-
ance document that addresses relevant issues.As result
an Expert Task Group of international experts were
formed by the JCSS in April 2006 with the aim pro-
ducing the document Provision and Assessment of
Structural Robustness which is introduced in the rest
of this paper.
3 CURRENT PRINCIPLES OF DESIGNING
FOR ROBUSTNESS
The currently used methods of designing for robust
structural systems that originated in the UK have now
been adopted by various countries with slight modi-
fications, where appropriate, by other countries and
international codes such as the Eurocodes.
The philosophy of design, as provided in the
Eurocodes suite, is presented below. A comprehen-
sive list of different countries’ requirements will be
available in the guidance document.
In Eurocode 1991-1-7 (CEN 2006), where design-
ing for robustness is introduced, there are two design
situations to be considered:
1. designing against identified accidental actions, and
2. designing against unidentified actions (where the
designing against disproportionate collapse, or for
robustness, is important).
As obvious from their names, these are situations
where the designer is aware or not aware, respectively,
of the possible hazards that could test the robustness
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of a particular structural system. The hazard(s) to be
so considered can be
– known ordinary and extraordinary actions,
– known and unknown quality and gross errors from
human inactivity or activity, and
– unknown hazards that may pose a danger to a
particular structure or structures in general.
The methods used to design for robustness of a
structural system can be divided into several levels
based on the potential consequences of structural fail-
ure, categorised in terms of a building’s Consequence
Class (CC):
CC1: Low consequences: No special requirements
CC2: Medium consequences: Handled using simpli-
fied equivalent static analysis methods or by
prescriptive rules
CC3: High consequences: Case by case reliability or
risk analysis. It may require refined methods of
structural analysis.
The strategies for designing a robust structural
system can include one or more of the following:
1. Prevent or reduce the action
2. Design the structure/key elements to sustain the
action
3. Design the structure to have a minimum level
of robustness by either providing alternative load
paths or using prescriptive rules which provide
sufficient redundancy and ductility.
In the third method above, the principle of preven-
tion of disproportionate collapse is utilised.According
to this principle, a localised failure due to an (acci-
dental) action may be acceptable, provided it will not
endanger the stability of the whole structure, and that
the overall load-bearing capacity of the structure is
maintained and allows necessary emergency measures
to be undertaken. The proportionality of failure can be
checked in practice by assessing the additional dam-
age that can result when each load-bearing member is
notionally removed, one at a time, from the structure.
The damage is considered to be disproportional if it
exceeds that given in the code. If the damage is dis-
proportional, then the particular load-bearing member
is either designed as a strong ‘Key Element’ or protec-
tive measures are undertaken to reduce its probability
of failure to an acceptable lower level.
For unidentified actions, the Key Element design
is carried out against a pressure of 34 kN/m2, which
is the UK Regulations’ requirement based on vented
internal gas explosion pressures (Canisius, 2006).
Note: Whether this over-pressure, which was origi-
nally intended for the design of walls of large panel
concrete buildings, should be used also as the general
minimum requirement for the design of Key Ele-
ments against any (unidentified) action is subject to
some debate at present: for example, in relation to
situations where a column may have ‘wrap-around’
effects of explosion pressure and a component may be
subject to concentrated (impact) forces.
In addition, the need to consider public percep-
tion issues when determining the accidental actions
to be taken into account is specifically mentioned in
EN1991-1-7.
It should be noted that robustness should be dis-
tinguished from accidental loads although some of
the design procedures and measures are similar. As
described above all structures should be robust regard-
less on the likelihood of accidental loads.
While the Eurocode and other national building
codes such as the UK Building Regulations (ODPM
2004) and (DS409 2006) provide comprehensive
details for designing structures against disproportion-
ate failure, and consider consequences indirectly, no
guidance is available in them for conducting com-
prehensive analyses of structural systems and the
consideration of risks on a probabilistic basis. The
JCSS document intends to fill this gap as described
in the later sections of this paper.
4 THE JCSS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON
ROBUSTNESS
A general introduction to the draft JCSS robust-
ness guidance document, Assessment and Provision
of Robustness, is presented in this section. The docu-
ment is comprehensive in that the many facets of the
issue of structural robustness are covered in it. It is felt
by the JCSS Task Group that the desire of the engi-
neering community for a state-of-the-art guidance on
robustness issues will be satisfied by this document.
The final draft of the document is expected to be ready
for publication in January, 2008.
As mentioned previously, the JCSS guidance doc-
ument is expected fill the important gap between
the philosophy and practice of providing robustness,
which usually is addressed in isolation by theoreticians
and practising engineers, respectively. Therefore, the
target audience of the document consists of those who
fall between philosophers and practising engineers: for
example code developers, specialist designers, Com-
petent Authorities and those involved in research and
development activities. However, although the guid-
ance document is not particularly written for practising
engineers, they too can make use of it as appropriate.
The JCSS guidance document will comprise ten
main chapters that deal with the following important
aspects:
• Historical and current practices
• Basic issues and parameters
• Robustness quantification and decision making
• A framework for designing for robustness
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• Assurance of robustness from conceptual design to
end-of-life of a structure.
Some particular topics the Guidance Document
intends address include:
1. The structural safety basis for current robustness
requirements.
2. Adequacy of current ‘deemed to satisfy’ rules that
describe various levels of tying of components of a
building, in a situation where multiple load-bearing
members can be lost.
3. Issues arising from ‘too much’ tying of a struc-
ture, especially under ‘deemed to satisfy’rules – for
example, non-confinement of collapse and ‘drag
down’ of a structure.
4. For the post 9/11 era, the adequacy of the assess-
ment of robustness by the notional (quasi-static)
removal of a single load bearing member, one at
a time. The possible extension of this method to
consider simultaneous multiple member loss.
5. The acceptability of currently specified limits on
additional damage due to the removal of a single
load bearing member, for situations where simul-
taneous loss of multiple members may need to be
considered.
6. Definition of structural systems for evaluating
robustness and related decision making.
7. Methods of quantifying robustness of a building or
a structural system to aid decision making.
8. The importance of non-structural consequences,
e.g. economical consequences and public morale,
in assessing risks and their relation to Consequence
Classes in EN1991-1-7 (and the UK Building
Regulations).
9. Decision making in relation to robustness issues.
Determination of optimum solutions, with or with-
out the inclusion of hazard elimination or reduction
measures.
10. Consideration of situations of changing risk within
a changing political and economical climate.
11. Consideration of multiple, serial actions. For exam-
ple, a fire or gas explosion after an earthquake and
a bomb explosion following a distracting fire.
12. Load combination issues and partial factors when
considering item 11 above or malicious actions that
may be deliberately initiated at peak load occasions.
13. Quality control during execution (construction) and
provision of maintenance regimes as means for
providing and assuring robustness.
14. Effects of human errors on robustness during var-
ious stages from conception to end-of-life of a
structure.
15. ‘Over-strength’ materials and components that can
modify structural behaviour (robustness) especially
when capacity design is involved.
Four of the main topics of the JCSS guidance
document, viz. system approaches, quantification of
robustness, decision making and quality/human error
issues are briefly introduced in the rest of this paper.
5 SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO ROBUSTNESS
Consideration of system effects is particularly impor-
tant when modelling robustness. Building code criteria
primarily focus on designing individual elements or
subsystems of a larger engineered system. This design
philosophy has generally been successful, except in
those instances where systems have suffered cas-
cading system failures due to a lack of robustness.
These potential failure mechanisms are the reason why
robustness criteria require system-level analysis.
A system-reliability approach to robustness assess-
ment is being considered by the Joint Committee on
Structural Safety. This approach takes advantage of
the considerable developments in probabilistic system
reliability analysis achieved in the past few decades.
By working in a reliability format, the randomness and
uncertainties inherent in robustness assessment can
be explicitly included, and decision analysis tools can
be used to balance the costs of robustness provision
against the benefits of increased system reliability.
While system reliability methods are most often used
to model physical structures, here it may be useful
to broaden a system to include the structure as well
as its associated inspection, maintenance and repair
procedures. This allows one to capture, for example,
the effect of various maintenance strategies on the
robustness of deteriorating systems.
A variety of system-reliability-based robustness
quantification methods have been considered by
researchers, and they are briefly described in the
following section.
6 METHODS OF QUANTIFYING
ROBUSTNESS
Risk- and reliability-based quantification approaches
address the shortcomings of the practical approaches
by explicitly considering the many uncertainties asso-
ciated with the problem, such as uncertainties in future
loading and uncertainties in system properties. These
approaches have the potential to provide a more com-
prehensive picture of a system’s robustness, but they
are generally too complex to be useful in typical
design situations. Further, most approaches of this
type require a probabilistic model for future loading
on a structure, and this can be difficult to determine
for some events of interest such as sabotage. Despite
these limitations, reliability-based approaches show
great promise in helping to understand system prop-
erties that lead to robustness, and they will also aid in
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benchmarking the performance of simplified robust-
ness requirements found in building codes. Several
proposed methods are briefly described here.
Recognizing that present code-based analysis pro-
cedures can not give a complete picture of a structure’s
robustness, a variety of probability-based quantifica-
tion procedures has been proposed. Common aspects
of these approaches include attempts to quantify the
complete range of potential loading on structures, as
well as associated probabilities of occurrence for those
load scenarios, and quantification of uncertainty in
structural properties or structural response.
Note that redundancy in systems is closely related
to the concept of robustness. While redundant systems
are generally believed to be more robust, there are
additional methods of providing robustness that are
not related to redundancy. The approaches described
briefly below relate to both redundancy and robust-
ness, with individual approaches placing more empha-
sis on one aspect or another.
(Frangopol and Curley 1987) and (Fu and
Frangopol 1990) considered probabilistic indices to
measure structural redundancy, based on the relation
between damage probability and system failure proba-
bility. Fu and Frangopol proposed a redundancy index
(RI ) defined as
where Pf (dmg) is the probability of damage occur-
rence to the system and Pf (sys) is the system failure
probability. This index indicates the reserve strength
of a system (i.e., the residual strength of a system
that has sustained damage). Frangopol and Curley
considered deterministic safety factors to measure
redundancy, but their alternative systems-reliability
approach is most relevant here. They studied the
following redundancy factor
where βintact is the reliability index of the intact system
and βdamaged is the reliability index of the damaged
system. The index varies between 0 and ∞, with 0
indicating a failed structure and ∞ representing a very
robust structure.
(Lind 1995,1996) proposed a generic measure of
system damage tolerance, based on the increase in
failure probability resulting from the occurrence of
damage.The vulnerability (V ) of a system is defined as
where rd is the resistance of the damaged system, r0 is
the resistance of the undamaged system, and S is the
prospective loading on the system.P( · ) is the prob-
ability of failure of the system, as a function of the
load and resistance of the system. This vulnerability
parameter indicates the loss of system reliability due
to damage.
(Baker and Faber 2006) proposed a metric for
robustness of an engineered system. The approach
divides consequences into direct consequences asso-
ciated with local component damage (that might be
considered proportional to the initiating damage) and
indirect consequences associated with subsequent sys-
tem failure (that might be considered disproportional
to the initiating damage). An index is formulated by
comparing the risk associated with direct and indi-
rect consequences. The index of robustness (IRob) is
defined as
where RDirandRIndare the direct and indirect risks,
respectively. The index takes values between zero and
one, with larger values indicating larger robustness.
The motivation for this index is that systems hav-
ing high risk associated with indirect consequences
are more likely to suffer disproportionate damage
consequences and thus be less robust. In addition to
quantifying the effect of the physical system’s design,
this approach can potentially account for the effect of
inspection, maintenance and repair strategies as well
as preparedness for accidental events, because those
actions can reduce failure consequences and thus risk.
The authors present a discussion of how decision anal-
ysis theory can be used to make decisions regarding
acceptable robustness.
In a study related to reliability based methods,
(Ben-Haim 1999) proposed a robustness quantifi-
cation approach using information-gap theory. This
approach does not require the complete probabilistic
description of loading that is needed for reliability-
based assessments, and it can be applied to general
systems.The cost associated with this advantage is that
it is no longer possible to explicitly balance robustness
improvements with their associated costs.
Several researchers have considered vulnerability
of specific classes of structures to specific damage
scenarios [(Agarwal et al. 2003), (Ellingwood and
Leyendecker 1978), Feng and Moses 1986)]. A rel-
atively well-studied case is the progressive collapse of
frame structures. This work is important for character-
izing robustness of specific structures, but it is often
difficult to generalize these findings to other types of
systems or other sources of damage.
Another aspect that quantification of robustness
could help in is the determination of acceptable levels
of additional (indirect) damage that can be permitted
when using the notional load-bearing member removal
5
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method of design. For this semi-probabilistic limit-
state design method, the limits on indirectly damaged
floor area are usually specified in both real and rel-
ative terms. The real value limit for damage to one
floor, that results from the removal of a single load-
bearing member, is not unique in different building
codes/regulations: for example, 100 m2 in Eurocode
1991-1-7, 75 m2 in the UK Building Regulations and
240 m2 in the Danish code (DS 409, 2006). How-
ever, this difference is acceptable because the value
is nationally determined to suit an individual coun-
try. However, the current limits (both real and relative)
used within a country may become unacceptable, or
too stringent, if semi-probabilistic design is to be used
for assessing robustness against terrorist attacks by
considering the simultaneous loss of several mem-
bers, for example as proposed by (Alexander 2004).
Their direct use to assess buildings against a multiple
member loss situation can easily lead to uneconomical
structures. Therefore, (Canisius 2006) has proposed a
probabilistic method of evaluating acceptable levels of
damage to be used in multiple-member loss situations.
This method allows the use of protective measures
as a means of improving robustness of the structural
system. To check the method’s usefulness (or not), it
is being currently applied to a practical example in
relation to the UK’s Building Regulations.
7 DECISION MAKING RELATED TO
ROBUSTNESS
Robustness is related to scenarios where exposures
including unintentional loads and defects result in
a damage to the structural system, and where this
damage may lead to collapse of the structure. In a
probabilistic formulation this can be related to the
following framework, see e.g. also (Sørensen and
Christensen, 2006):
• Exposure no i: Ei with probability P(Ei). Examples
of unintentional loads and defects: changed load
case; wrong structural modelling; wrong computa-
tional model; error related to material.
• Damage no j: Dj: probability of damage no j given
exposure no i: P(Dj|Ei). Examples: loss of column
and failure of 15% of storey area
• Consequence: C implying the total probability of
collapse:
where the summations are over all exposures and
damages and P(C|Ei ∩ Dj) is the probability of
collapse given exposure no i and damage no j.
Example: collapse of major part of structural system
(building, bridge, . . .).
Based on equation (5) decisions related to increase
robustness can be made. It seen that the probability of
collapse can be reduced (and robustness increased) by:
• Reduce one or more of the probabilities of exposures
P(E1), P(E2), . . .
• Reduce one or more of the probabilities of dam-
ages P(D1|E1), P(D2|E2), . . . or reduce the extent of
the damages. Examples: strengthen vital structural
elements – key elements (e.g. column): implying
that P(Dj|Ei) is reduced; strengthen/redesign rein-
forced concrete slab in order to reduce extent of
storey damage.
• Reduce one or more of the probabilities P(C|
E1 ∩ D1), P(C|E2 ∩ D2), . . . . Example: increase
redundancy of structure.
It is noted that for damages related to key elements:
P(C|Ei ∩ Dj) ∼= 1.
Increasing the robustness at the design stage will
in many cases only increase the cost of the structural
system marginally – the key point is often to use a
reasonable combination of a suitable structural sys-
tem and materials with a ductile behaviour. In other
cases increased robustness will influence the cost of
the structural system. If more alternatives to increase
the robustness are considered, then from a decision
theoretical point of view, the optimal alternative k is
that which results in the smallest expected total costs:
where CF is the cost of a collapse, P(C|alternative k)
is the probability of collapse given that alternative k is
chosen and CR,k is the cost of alternative k .
8 EFFECTS OF QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION
AND GROSS ERRORS
It is known that nearly 90% of structural failures have
been caused by poor quality or human error (Allen
1992).
There are two main issues that need to be addressed
in controlling the quality of structures (Canisius 2000):
• Gross errors, or ‘human errors’, which may occur
at any stage of the life of a structure, such
as design, detailing, construction, inspection and
maintenance, and even in use.
• Quality errors in materials and fabrication.
In addition errors can occur during research and
codification, potentially leading to deficient design
guidance. Poor quality material or components can be
present in a structure due to various reasons, includ-
ing damage, attempts at excessive saving of resources
at any stage of the design-resourcing-manufacture-
supply-construction-inspection-maintenance chain,
and pure negligence (op cit.).
6
Mori CH128.tex 14/6/2007 8: 56 Page 7
Code specified actions and load combinations for
verification of sufficiency of safety generally take
into account the loads, including accidental actions,
to which a structure is normally exposed. However,
unintentional and, sometimes, intentional defects may
occur in a structure and robustness should aid to limit
the possible consequences of such situations. Interest-
ingly, while robustness can help to nullify some effects
of quality errors, the errors and defects themselves can
detrimentally affect the robustness of a structural sys-
tem. Therefore robustness should not be considered as
designing against gross errors that can be avoided by
other means.
Design and execution errors are found in most struc-
tures in various degrees and to various extents, but
normally these errors are within the acceptable inac-
curacies covered by the safety factors in the structural
codes. Fatal defects can in many cases be traced back
to gross / human errors.The consequences of a damage
caused by such gross / human errors may be limited
by suitable structural robustness. Unintentional and
unforeseen loads and load effects may also appear due
to human errors, for example due to wrong handling or
wrong manoeuvres.As an example imposed loads may
change in time compared to the predictions at the time
of design of the structure. One example is increased
storey loads because of change in use of the building.
Another example is the change of ship types that has
lead to a dramatic increase of possible impact loads
for bridges and bridge piers. These types of load con-
ditions may be prevented or limited by a skilled and
responsible administration of the structures. However,
suitable built-in robustness would most likely limit the
consequences of such unforeseen loads.
The quantification of quality issues is a difficult
exercise and may not be that desirable for many situa-
tions. While the quality issues related to materials and
fabrication is relatively easy to deal with by consider-
ing past data, it is not so that easy for gross errors which
can be affected by reasons such as lack of training,
lack of motivation, over-work, and a simple disregard
for quality. In many situations, prevention of the detri-
mental causes and the design of the structure to be
insensitive to errors (which itself is a way of making
it robust) can be efficient ways of preserving struc-
tural robustness for its later mobilisation against other
identified or unidentified actions.
Another quality issue that needs to be kept in mind is
the provision of over-strong materials or components
to a ‘capacity-designed’ structure. In this case, instead
of preventing disproportionate failure, the stronger
material can become the cause of a disproportionate
failure.
The above and other important issues are addressed
in the JCSS guidance document by also considering
them as hazards to be considered in a formal reliability
analysis.
9 CONCLUSIONS
The Joint Committee on Structural Safety (JCSS) is
actively contributing to the advancement of knowledge
on robustness of structural systems.
The JCSS Guidance Document on Robustness
of Structural Systems, Provision and Assessment of
Robustness of Structural Systems, would fill the gap
between the philosophical and practical approaches
to robustness. This would be achieved by putting
philosophical aspects of robustness into a format use-
able for solving practical engineering problems and,
where possible, converting practical methods into
probabilistic formats to formalise them.
The Guidance Document addresses various
issues by
– taking a systems approach to robustness, so that
complete chains of events from hazards to conse-
quences of failure can be considered in a manner
complementary to current codes and regulations,
– allowing the consideration of issues that can arise
throughout the life of a structural system, i.e. from
its conceptive design to the end-of-life, including
deterioration and maintenance issues,
– giving importance to public perception issues and
quality/human error aspects of robustness.
In considering these aspects together, rational holis-
tic solutions can be developed for robustness problems
that arise in structural engineering.
The JCSS guidance document would also present a
probabilistic methodology for decision making to aid
in the selection of optimum solutions, based on cost or
risk criteria. The various aspects mentioned above will
be incorporated within a Framework for Designing for
Robustness. Owing such contents, the guidance docu-
ment is expected to become an invaluable resource for
the target audience and others.
Where a topic cannot be addressed comprehen-
sively within the available timescale, guidance will
be provided on possible approaches to adopt. These
topics are expected to be taken up later for fur-
ther development within the JCSS’ latest initiative:
a four-year European COST Action on Robustness.
This initiative, which started in April 2007 and brings
together also non-European experts, would research
and develop methods for dealing with robustness
issues of structural systems.
The JCSS guidance document is scheduled to be
published in January 2008.
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